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International Human Rights Intervention on

Behalf of Minorities in Post-World War I
Eastern Europe and Today: Placebo, Poison,
or Panacea?
EthanA. Klingsbergt

Since the collapse of communism, the media dutifully has
reported the latest ethnic conflicts which have percolated to the
forefront of East European politics. Seeking resolution of these
conflicts, politicians and analysts have advanced a plethora of
prescriptions. These proposals can be categorized as "bottom up"
prescriptions, which rely upon grassroots social activity, and "top
down" prescriptions, which rely primarily upon a "commandobedience" relationship.'

" Law Professor, Central European University, and Director, Institute for Constitutional and Legislative Policy. The views expressed herein are my own and not those of my
employer, the Soros Foundation. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the
University of Chicago Law School Roundtable's Symposium on the Rights of Minorities in
East European Constitutions on February 20, 1993. I express thanks to those who attended and participated in the Symposium for their comments.
For elaboration of this distinction, see Ethan Klingsberg, Judicial Review and
Hungary's Transitionfrom Communism to Democracy, 1992 BYU L Rev 41,43-46 & nn 15 (drawing from the philosophical insights of Hannah Arendt and Emanuel Levinas);
Hanna Pitkin, Obligation and Consent, 49 Am Pol Sci Rev 990 (1965) (drawing from
Locke); See also Richard Epstein, International News Service v. Associated Press: Custom
and Law as Sources of PropertyRights in News, 78 Va L Rev 85, 85 (1992) (if "property
comes from the bottom up, and not from the top down.... , the state does not hand down
the law or create property rights ... its chief function is to discover and reflect accurate-

ly... the community").
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Part I provides an overview of such bottom up mechanisms
as popular sovereignty based constitutionalism, a revival of civil
society corporatism, and free market activity. I then analyze the
historical, sociological, and political foundations of criticisms that
these mechanisms are incompatible with social reality. Although
these criticisms overlook significant post-conventional or cosmopolitan trends in the region, I conclude that there is a strong case
against reliance upon bottom up solutions to East European
ethnic conflicts. Consequently, the rest of the article focuses upon
a top down alternative-international promulgation and enforcement of legal rules and rights necessary for a version of liberal
pluralism.
Unfortunately, this top down prescription may more often
function in Eastern Europe as a placebo or a poison than as a
panacea. Part II explains why the problems plaguing current
international efforts to resolve ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe
resemble those pitfalls that Hannah Arendt, a socio-political
scholar, and Pablo de Azcarate, Director of the League of
Nations' Minorities Section, detected in the League of Nations'
work to solve minority problems in the very same region after
World War I. Both then and now, the international community
has recognized the rights of certain ethnic groups to national selfdetermination and then has attempted to implement legislation
to protect minorities in the new nations. I point to past and
contemporary problems with this "self-determination syndrome"
and rebut thoughtful and practical arguments in favor of partition along ethnic lines. Then I analyze the ineffectiveness of postWorld War I and current international minorities protection
legislation and the adjudicatory organs charged with enforcing
such legislation. The sources of that ineffectiveness include the
absence of grassroots legitimacy, reactionary "backlashes" from
domestic governments and both majority and minority ethnic
groups, and administrative difficulties.
At the outset, I would like to make it clear that this article
argues against neither the ends of international human rights
instruments and initiatives nor the dedication of energy toward
international human rights efforts. In particular, I do not mean
to suggest that international human rights endeavors are the
root cause of the present conflicts. My point is simply that resorting to internationally imposed and enforced minorities protection
instruments has many inadequacies and indirect costs. There are
the lessons to be learned from these pitfalls, but these lessons

InternationalHuman Rights Intervention

call for a conscientious approach, not the end of international
human rights enforcement.
As set forth in my closing remarks, historical support does
exist for international bodies to use certain mechanisms in the
effort to resolve East European ethnic conflicts. I draw these
conclusions from an analysis of the relative success of the League
of Nations' Minorities Committee in comparison with the
League's adjudicatory organ, the Council. I conclude by arguing
that if the international community cannot bear the costs of generation-long, full-scale military intervention, then an approach
like that of the Minorities Committee is necessary.
I. THE CASE AGAINST 'BOTTOM UP' SOLUTIONS TO EAST
EUROPEAN ETHNIC CONFLICTS

Prescriptions for the resolution of East European ethnic
conflicts2 from the bottom up-via mechanisms such as popular
sovereignty based constitutionalism, a revival of civil society
corporatism, and free market opportunities-are subject to criticism for being incompatible with social reality. The popular sovereignty based constitutionalism prescription, as advocated by
Bruce Ackerman, envisions the blossoming of pluralistic, social
democracies in East-Central Europe via the process of "liberal
revolution," which entails supermajority-oriented (republican)
mechanisms for drafting, ratification, and implementation of
rights-based constitutions.3 Civil society prescriptions call for the
empowerment of private sector "associational life" on the grounds

Why treat the different ethnic conflicts of East-Central Europe and the former
Soviet Union as all subject to the same normative analysis? John A. Armstrong provides a
good justification based not only on the somewhat shared past under Marxist-Leninism,
but also upon common characteristics that run much deeper historically. See John A.
Armstrong, Toward a Framework for ConsideringNationalism in East Europe, 2 E Eur
Pol & Societies 280 (1988).
' Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution (Yale, 1992). Ackerman prescribes the formation of republican constitutional conventions that would "construct a
constitutional symbol that might serve as a rallying point for a mobilized liberal politics."
Id at 62. He foresees a ratification process that would bring forward the "considered
support [for 'liberalism] of a self-conscious and deliberate majority." Id at 15. Finally, he
advocates a specially structured and politically astute judiciary that could "build strong
support for the constitution among the People." Id at 99. He emphasizes that the courts
would not function as merely an imposing "political and judicial elite" issuing "benign
decisions," but as vehicles for "channelling] .... political energies" and "seiz[ing] the
moment to mobilize popular support for a liberal constitution." Id at 112. He concludes
that achievement of this mass political consciousness raising is a prerequisite to economic
productivity, the implementation of privatization and a free market, and the development
of civil society. Id at 46-47.
2
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that interaction among grassroots groups produces harmonious
and efficient results.4 Finally, the free market remedy foresees
new capitalist opportunities as inspiring rational market behavior, which in turn causes movement away from ethnic clashes
and toward Western democratic values.5
Criticism of each of these bottom up prescriptions points out
that given the "endogeneity" of the recommended bottom up solution, East European social realities render the proposal inapplicable to the region or "pre-sociological."6 As sociologist Ernest
Gellner puts it, these prescriptions bring to mind an analogy to
Henry Higgins' refrain, "Why can't a woman be more like a
man?": "Why can't these Russians and East Europeans be more
like Americans?"7
These schemes, which are drawn from Western social and
political theory, are not necessarily transferrable. Ackerman's
critics describe an absence of constitutional consciousness in
Eastern Europe.8 Post-communist civil society theory skeptics,
among whom are many East European theorists who during the

' For examples, see Adam Seligman's portrayal of Michael Walzer's and Charles
Taylor's civil society prescriptions in the context of East European developments. Adam B.
Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society 164, 197 (Macmillan, 1992) (describing theories set
forth in Charles Taylor, Modes of Civil Society, 3 Public Culture 95 (1990) and Michael
Walzer, The Idea of Civil Society, 38 Dissent 303 (1991)). Much of the basis for relying on
the empowerment of civil society as a solution to East European ethnic conflicts stems
from a reaction to the fact that communism's severe suppression of interaction within civil
society served to stunt the evolution of East European ethnic cultures toward the type of
modern rationality prevalent among many ethnic cultures in the West today. See note 20
and accompanying text (discussing how communism fostered ethnic problems).
' See, for example, Richard Posner, The New World Gallops to the Rescue of the Old,
E Eur Const Rev 35 (Fall 1992).
' Judge Posner criticizes Ackerman for ignoring the "endogeneity" of constitutionmaking. Id at 36; Adam Seligman uses the term "pre-sociological" in his criticism of civil
society theory. Seligman, Civil Society at 196 (cited in note 4).
Ernest A. Gellner, Innocent Abroad, New Republic 38 (Nov 30, 1992).
8 For a criticism of the popular sovereignty based constitutionalism approach described in note 3, see Posner, E Eur Const Rev at 35-37 (cited in note 5); Gellner, Innocent
Abroad at 39 (claiming that Ackerman's prescription is unfeasible due to "an
[in]sufficiently acute sense of... the present situation") (cited in note 7).
Although Seligman has not directly addressed Ackerman's prescription, he has portrayed American style constitutionalism as a product of "the very ideology of Americanism, its civil religion," Seligman, Civil Society at 109-110 (cited in note 4), as opposed to
the product of a transferable liberal revolutionary process, which Ackerman seems to purport is at the foundation of the American design. See Ackerman, Liberal Revolution at 1418 (cited in note 3). Seligman also sees judicial review in a different light than Ackerman.
Compare Ackerman's vision of the democratic-republican foundation of judicial review,
Ackerman, Liberal Revolution at 99 (cited in note 3), with Adam B. Seligman, Oral
remarks at Hungarian Sociological Association Convention's Workshop on Civil Society,
Budapest, 1991 ("judicial review is the last remnant of natural law").

InternationalHuman Rights Intervention
1980s propounded civil society as a means to fight communism,'
argue that functional interaction among private sector associations is inconceivable in East European societies "where pluralism is not solely of interests, but of affective ideological universes
as well." 0 A modern civil society cannot thrive where the notion
of constructive interest group interaction "does not fully exist"
beforehand." Detractors of free market salvation outline the
monumental social obstacles to free market transition including:
resistance by those actors (state managers and employees, as

well as black marketeers) with vested interests in the old system,
the burdensome and paradoxical prerequisite of affirmative state
action on a grand scale to privatize a state socialist economy,
the affinity of the region's widespread ethnic primordialism 5 to
the internal economic logic of state socialism,'4 and how those
subject to economic hardships during the initial stages of a free
market transition are more susceptible to participation in ethnic

' Seligman, Civil Society at 200 (cited in note 4).

'0 Id at 179.

" Id at 179 (arguing that Eastern Europe has nothing to gain from Charles Taylor's
call for re-empowerment of traditional-communitarian corporate ties). For an analysis of
"the crisis of post-communist civil society," drawing on data and observations from
throughout the region, see Ethan Klingsberg, Rebuilding Civil Society: Constitutionalism
and the Post-CommunistParadox,13 Mich J Intl L 865 (1992).
12 Posner's free market prescription may well be subject to the same "neglect of
endogeneity" charge which he launches against Ackerman's popular sovereignty based
constitution-making prescription and which Seligman launches against civil society
theorists. Compare Posner, E Eur Const Rev at 35-39 (cited in note 5) (describing transition to a free market as necessitating only "fairly elementary" tasks of institutional
transformation and the "technical" matter of privatization) with Klingsberg, 13 Mich J
Intl L at 898-901 (cited in note 11) (describing monumental obstacles to free market
transition stemming from: (1) contemporary economic actors' (state managers and employees, as well as black marketeers) and political actors' perceptions that they have vested
interests in the old system and (2) the paradoxical requirement of affirmative state action
on a grand scale to transform a state socialist economy to a free market) (citing Istvan R.
Gabor, On the Immediate Prospects for Private Entrepreneurship and Reembourgeoisement in Hungary (Cornell Project on Comparative Institutional Analysis,
Working Papers on Transitions from State Socialism, No. 90.3, 1990); Edmund K.
Mokrzycki, The Social Limits of East European Economic Reforms (New School for Social
Research East & Central Europe Program Democracy Seminar Working Paper Series,
1991); and other evidence).
13 By "primordial" I intend to signify a publicly and privately separatist cultural outlook. For discussion of the term, see Armstrong, 2 E Eur Pol & Societies at 282 n 2 (cited
in note 2) (warily transferring Arend Lijpart's definition of the term in the context of
Western Europe to the context of Eastern Europe (citing A. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural
Societies (Yale, 1977) (defining "primordial loyalties" as "ideological, religious, linguistic,
and regional")).
14 Herbert Kitschelt, The Formationof Party Systems in East Central Europe, Politics
& Society 7, 16-20 (Mar 1992)
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conflicts than rational market conduct."
Such criticism is supported by a variety of historical, sociological, and political legacies which indicate that contemporary
East European cultures are not prone toward solidarity, rational
interaction, or compromise with proximate "others" living within
the same region or even nation. Current trends toward ethnic
strife are fortified by the legacies of centralized government rather than autonomous city-states, as well as by the traditional
ethnic segmentation within urban areas and the lack of urbancountryside assimilation." Further support comes from the residue of those pre-communist eras marked predominantly by discretionary elitist and state power rather than a reciprocity of
rights, 7 and the exercise of economic control by neo-feudal administrative nobles rather than independent entrepreneurs and
land owning peasants. 8 Moreover, national ethnic identities in
Eastern Europe tend to have origins in myths contrived from
non-integrative peasant cultures rather than from politically
empowered cultures that had prior experience with harmonizing
different identities. 9 Adding to these legacies is the communist
" Tibor Varady, Oral Remarks at Roundtable Symposium on the Rights of Minorities
in East European Constitutions, University of Chicago Law School, Feb 19, 1993.
6 For discussion of how the "residue" of the history of cities in East-Central Europe
underlies contemporary cultural hostility toward minorities, see Armstrong, 2 E Eur Pol
& Societies at 290-94, 304 (cited in note 2); Seligman, Civil Society at 157-60 (cited in note
4).
17 Seligman, Civil Society at 157-60 (cited in
note 4).
19 Id.
'9 Ernest Renan, What is a Nation? (Martin Thorn trans) in Homi K. Bhabha, ed,
Nation and Narration 8, 10-12 (Routledge, 1990) (describing how Western European
nations were formed by integration of various ethnicities (often by violent means) and
how, "by contrast... [to] these great laws of the history of Western European nations,"
East European ethnicities "remained as distinct as they were 800 years ago" when it came
to the era of nation building); see also Armstrong, 2 E Eur Pol & Societies at 292-94 (cited
in note 2) (describing the East European "processfes] of standardizing diverse peasant
masses ...
by pedagogical and journalistic professionals appealing to rural segments['] ... cultural patterns [which were] sharply divergent from gentry norms" and
"which have continued to color nationalist attitudes ... [with such elements as]: Celebration of inherited status over occupational achievement; rejection of rational calculation
in favor of romantic daring and material liberality; praise of outdoor life in field and
forest in contrast to cultivation of urban intellectual and aesthetic interests"); Gyorgy
Csepeli, Competing Patterns of National Identity in Post-Communist Hungary, 13 Media
Culture & Society 328 (1991) (in Hungary 'the concept of 'the nation' came before the
establishment of proper [integrated and universally representative] national institutions
and the emerging national ideology therefore had to refer more actively to elements of the
ethnocentric heritage"); Ernest A. Gellner, L'avvento del nazionalismo, e la sua
interpretazione.I miti della nazione e della classe, in Perry Anderson, ed, Storia d'Europa
1, 36-37, 48 (forthcoming 1993) (all citations are to Gellner's personal English translation
which is on file with the author and the U Chi L Sch Roundtable) ("Gellner English
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era's negative modernity which entailed a combination of false
universalism with harsh restrictions that prevented primordial

ethnic identities from integrating meaningfully and developing
out of their pre-communist condition. 0 Furthermore, assimilation by different East European ethnic groups into a core culture
was often frustrated by the absence of an overwhelming majority
of any particular group within a country or region and the inabil-

ity of any culture to stand out as stronger from either a productivity or spiritual perspective.2 '
These characterizations of primordialism in Eastern Europe
often overlook significant post-conventional trends in the region.
Such trends include the social modernization in Hungary since
the 1960s,' the republican roots of much of the Hungarian Constitutional Court's Western style jurisprudence,' the civil soci-

Manuscript") (in contrast to Western European nationalisms, "virulent" East European
nationalisms emerged via freelance activist "awakeners" who created ethno-national
myths "not in opposition to peasant idiosyncrasy, but on the basis of it" and its "Poetry of
Unreason") (citing J. Plamenatz, Two Types of Nationalismin E. Kamenka, ed, Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of An Identity (St. Martin's, 1976) (drawing distinction
between Western nationalisms that emerged from expansion of a statist "high" culture
and Eastern nationalisms that emerged from ethnic cultures without any pre-existing
political authority)).
' See Gellner English Manuscript at 38-39 (cited in note 19) (describing how communism stagnated ethnic cultures' evolution toward acceptance of globalism); Seligman, Civil
Society at 163-65 (cited in note 4) (developing Elemer Hankiss' "negative modernity"
thesis).
Moreover, communism often fostered ethnic primordialism by casting individuals in
the dual role of pre-modern regional or tribal boss and communist apparatchik. See, for
example, Misha Glenny, Yugoslavia: The Revengers Tragedy, The New York Review of
Books 37, 40-41 (Aug 13, 1992) (describing Albaniin communist/ethnic leaders in Kosovo);
George I. Mirsky, Central Asia's Emergence, Current History 334, 334-35 (Oct 1992)
(describing how communism enhanced clan consciousness through example of local
tribal/apparatchik "godfathers" of Soviet Central Asia); George Schopflin, Power, Ethnicity, and Communism in Yugoslavia, New Hungarian Q 3, 22-23 (Winter 1992-93) (describing how "communism operated hand-in-glove with nationalism in Macedonia" and with
the evolution of "Moslem national consciousness").
21 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism at 273 (Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1973) (discussing factors working "against assimilation" in Eastern Europe
during early twentieth century).
' See Democracy is the Guarantee of Modernisation:President Goncz on Hopes and
Woes, Hungarian News Agency-Daily News 1 (Jan 7, 1993) (Gncz explained in his 1993
New Year's Address how since the mid-1960s, "social modernisation" has "changed the
pattern of society and brought public thinking up to date. What's more, it effectively
helped prepare the ground for the eventual social, economic and political transformation
that is referred to as the change of regime."); see also Armstrong, 2 E Eur Pol & Societies
at 299 (cited in note 2) (explaining how Hungary was an "exception" among the communist bloc in that after 1956 it engaged in at least "a tacit acceptance of the urban
'bourgeois' values once rejected by Magyar nationalism").
' Klingsberg, 1992 BYU L Rev at 125-36 (cited in note 1).
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ety dynamism and public compromises that led to the adoption of
the new Polish abortion law,2 4 the lack of strong ethnic
identification among a significant number of citizens of the former Yugoslavia," the "meta-ethnic self-consciousness" of many
citizens of the former Soviet Union,2 6 and the development of
skills and cultural interests along Western rather than tribal
lines among many former communist apparatchiks.7
One hypothesis that would resolve the conflicting evidence of
post-conventionalism and premodern impulses in Eastern Europe, which has not yet been researched adequately, is that East
Europeans largely possess dual identities in that they simultaneously manifest both premodern and post-conventional allegiances.'
This idea of radical primordial/post-conventional
24 Pro-choice observers are quick to condemn the new Polish abortion law as an

example of Church intolerance, while neglecting to notice that the process leading to the
passage of the compromise legislation demonstrated healthy characteristics of a modern
and dynamic civil society, such as: (1) a willingness on the part of the Church to interact
and compromise with other civic movements; (2) the diversity of Catholic public opinion;
and (3) the capacity of public opinion to mobilize itself effectively through vehicles other
than the Church with respect to an issue central to Church beliefs. For descriptions of the
events leading to the enactment of the abortion law, including reports on public surveys,
the civic groups behind referendum initiatives, and the adoption of compromise positions
by Church Primate Jozef Glemp and others. See The Warsaw Voice's weekly coverage
from December 1992 through February 1993.
' See Report of the CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia 7 (Jan
1992) ("CSCE I") (discussing the "considerable number of Yugoslav citizens" who lack any
strong ethnic identity and now "face] risk of annihilation or forced assimilation") (on file
with the U Chi L Sch Roundtable); Rasto Mocnik, Response to My Friends, in Roundtable
Conference of Independent Scholars from All Republics of Former Yugoslavia 11, 12, 14
(Oct 1992) ("Mocnik Response") (on file with the U Chi L Sch Roundtable) (charging
Westerners with being "blind to civil resistance against the war and the regime in Serbia
and Montenegro, [and] dismiss[ing] important progressive and peace oriented groups in
Croatia"; attributing "European public sphere['s] literal{] flood [ofl stereotype interpretations" of inhabitants of former Yugoslavia to West's 'orientalist' prejudice").
' See Vil Bakhirov, New Ethnic Relations Generated By Disintegration of a Multinational State: The Case of the Ex-USSR (Paper presented at International Conference on
"Ethnic Groups, Borders, Europe," organized by Italian Sociological Association and
Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia, Brioni, Croatia, Sep 18-19, 1992) (discussing increase in literacy, extensive urbanization, millions of inter-ethnic marriages, intellectual circles separate from the political order, and other evidence of "Soviet meta-ethnic
self-consciousness") (citing G. Starovitova, State Society Nation (1990)) (unpublished paper
on file with the U Chi L Sch Roundtable).
27 For a prediction that many of the communist world's so called "technical administrative intelligentsia" will abstain from tribal identification in the post-communist era because they possess skills and cultural interests along Western lines, see Herbert
Kitschelt, The Formationof Party Systems in East Central Europe, 20 Politics & Society 7,
23-26 (1992).
See generally Homi K. Bhabha, Narratingthe Nation, in Nation and Narration 1,
3-4 (cited in note 19) (describing inherent "Janus faced" ambiguity of nationalist identification); Klingsberg, 1992 BYU L Rev at 97 n 138 (cited in note 1) (discussing ease with
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schizophrenia occurred to me during a visit to Zagreb where I
joined crowds stopping in at a gallery to view an exhibit that
brutally satirized Croatian nationalist symbols. I then continued
with the same crowds as they moved on down the road to browse
stalls with merchants selling Ustasha and Croatian Army paraphernalia.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: THE 'ToP DOWN'
ALTERNATIVE

Despite the indications of a post-conventional counterweight
in Eastern Europe, the evidence of ethnic primordialism and
other trends antithetical to broad-based solidarity still presents a
very strong case against reliance upon bottom up solutions to
East European ethnic conflicts. For this reason, I have chosen to
investigate a "top down" alternative: international enforcement of
legal rules and rights necessary for some version of liberal pluralism.
The justification for this top down strategy is that once these
rules and rights have been in place for a while, ethnic groups,
like those nationalities whose capacities to engage in collective
aggression were constrained after World War II, will observe the
industrial age successes that emanate from living under such
conditions and subsequently adopt the outsider enforced rules as
their own. Apparently inspired by this hypothesis, the European
Community and private foundations are currently dedicating
resources to attempts to impose blueprints for pluralistic societies
in ethnically divided areas of Eastern Europe via international
law enforcement and other top down mechanisms. In particular,
they have targeted the republics of the former Yugoslavia, such
as Croatia.
The problems plaguing current international efforts to resolve ethnic conflicts in East-Central Europe bear a strong resemblance to those pitfalls that Hannah Arendt, a socio-political
scholar, and Pablo de Azcarate, Director of the League of
Nations's Minorities Section, detected in their respective analyses
of the League of Nations's work in the very same region after
World War I.29 The course of events then, as now, is a clamoring
which mimesis (compliance with stereotypical conduct) can be coupled with conduct that
subverts a narrow identity) (citing M. Holquist, Stereotyping in Autobiography and
Historiography,9 Poetics Today 453 (1988); Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One
(Cornell, C. Porter trans, 1985) (discussing subversive duality of compliance with sexist

stereotypes)).
2

See Arendt, Totalitarianism265-325 (cited in note 21); Pablo de Azcarate y Florez,
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for the right to national self-determination by a distinct ethnic
group, followed by international recognition of that right to nationhood on the condition that the new nation nominally adopt a
minorities rights document, drafted by outside experts and subject to enforcement by the international community. Several
problems arise from the international community's apparently
well-intentioned acquiescence to and participation in this selfdetermination syndrome.
A. The Self-Determination Syndrome
The first problem with the role of international human rights
law in this syndrome is that it supports the legitimation of the
principle of national self-determination for distinct ethnic groups.
At least in Eastern Europe, the application of this principle leads
to the creation of nations for select groups either on an arbitrary
basis, or, more often, in response to the demands of those ethnic
groups most oriented towards tactics of collective aggression.
Such a strategy actually implements and recognizes the very
principles that cause many of the ethnic conflicts. For instance,
the international community's approach to Yugoslavia has fueled
conflicts by helping to shift what could have been a liberal rights
revolution to a revolution of collective groups. ° The international community's failure to recognize or overtly support a movement unless it speaks "the conflict-oriented official jargon "3 has
resulted in discrimination against those with either liberal oriented ethnic identities or no particular ethnic identity."
Despite the self-determination principle's discriminatory
character, several thoughtful commentators disagree with my
criticism. These analysts conclude that the only workable solution in Eastern Europe is to concede to demands for a plethora of
ethnically homogenous states.33 Although they recognize that

The League of Nations and National Minorities (Carnegie Foundation, Eileen E. Brooke
trans, 1945). See also, Hannah Arendt, On Revolution at 144-54 (Viking, 1965) (discussing
post-World War I European constitution-making). Arendt investigates the roots of totalitarianism and the significance of revolution, while Azcarate chronicles his experience with
the League for the benefit of future researchers.
SO See Mocnik Response at 12-13 (cited in note 25).
SI Id at 7; Interview with Aleksa Djilas, Uncaptive Minds 25, 28 (Summer 1992) (the
West's approach to Balkan conflicts overlooks the "genuine liberal democrats").
2 See note 25 and accompanying text (discussing often overlooked evidence of postconventional trends in Eastern Europe).
' See Aleksa Djilas, A House Divided, New Republic 38 (Jan 25, 1993) (arguing that
the only realistic international intervention in former Yugoslavia would be support for
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their chosen solution entails the costs of both population exchanges and multiplying the number of small nations, these
commentators still argue that the social reality of the situation
dictates in favor of partition and resettlement. 4
The short-cut partition solution must overcome not only the
ethical problems of population exchanges and encouragement of
discrimination against those without a strong ethnic identity, but
also evidence that this solution is incompatible with social reality-which is supposedly the strongest argument in favor of partition. The physical features of the post-communist region dictate
against the validation of an ethnic group's right to national selfdetermination. Arendt explains that while the Hapsburg Empire
had failed to "take[] into account or respond[] to the needs" of 100
million who sought identification with a nation-state, the succession states failed to account for 30 percent of that 100 million. 5
The root cause of this failure is the great number, small size, and
interregional residences of the ethnic groups of East-Central
Europe. Similarly, even if the former Soviet Union had adopted
Sakharov's proposal to divide the USSR into 53 national units,
this courageous move would have created several new problems:
67 "national minority groups" and over 700 smaller ethnic groups
would lack their own national unit; "natives" would be a minority
in many units; and a single non-native ethnic group would constitute a clear majority in certain units. 6 If Eastern Europe is
seen through the internationally validated paradigm of national
self-determination as "liberation", then whenever the international community purports to rescue an ethnic group from the
"prisonhouse of nations" by recognizing a new nation, it probably
has only created a "county jail for minorities."37 It is doubtful

regions partitioned among the various ethnic factions); Arend Lijphart, Democracy in
Plural Societies 45-46 (Yale, 1977) (citing with approval Louis Wirth, The Problem of
Minority Groups in Ralph Linton, ed, The Science of Man in the World Crisis 347, 372
(Columbia, 1945) (describing "valuable precedent" of the "fairly satisfactory exchange of
Turkish, Bulgar, and Greek populations after the Graeco-Turkish War of 1919-23")).
' See Lijphart, PluralSocieties at 46-47 (cited in note 33) ("'partition and its conse-

quences may be a small price to pay'" (quoting Norman J. G. Pounds, History and Geogra.
phy: A Perspective on Partition,18 Intl Aff 161, 172 (1964)); Hedley Bull, Society and
Anarchy in InternationalRelations in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds, Diplomatic Investigations:Essays in the Theory of InternationalPolitics 50 (Allen and Unwin,
1966).
Arendt, Totalitarianismat 271 n 7 (cited in note 21).
Bakhirov, New Ethnic Relations at 6 (cited in note 26).
I borrow the "county jail" metaphor from Gellner English Manuscript at 24 (cited
in note 19).
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that a partition and resettlement scheme could bring order to
this situation without causing disruptions equivalent to those
which the international community claims to be trying to prevent
or resolve.
B. The Pitfalls of International Minorities Protection Legislation
The next problem with the international human rights approach arises from its reliance upon internationally enforced
minorities rights documents to overcome the discrimination
which, as described in the previous section, inevitably stems from
the recognition of the self-determination principle. The following
application of Arendt's and Azcarate's respective analyses of the
post-World War I Minorities Treaties to Croatia's recently
adopted Constitutional Law of Human Rights and Freedoms and
the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities
(hereafter referred to as "the Carrington Law," after its author
Lord Carrington) demonstrates the elements of this problem. 8
The Carrington Law has a far greater breadth than the older
Minorities Treaties. For the most part, the Carrington Law is not
limited by distinctions between nationals, national minorities,
nationalities, ethnics, religious minorities, and other labels that
often distract such laws from their objective of universal protection. In addition, the Carrington Law provides for proportional
representation, limited local self-government in regions where
Serbs are in the majority, and both secondary or cultural rights
and primary rights, such as the rights to residence and economic
freedom. It also provides for international enforcement mechanisms. It is an excellent and comprehensive piece of work on
paper. There is perhaps no other document in the world that
invokes more international human rights accords, includes a
greater list of both positive and negative rights, and simultaneously makes strides toward a consociational structure.
1. Legitimacy.
The Carrington Law, despite these great advances, falters
exactly where the Minorities Treaties did earlier in the century.
' The Carrington Law tracks the provisions of an agreement designed in the Hague
in October 1991. The law as it currently stands was enacted in May 1992 under the
supervision of the European Community. It had been enacted earlier, but was then
modified as a result of European Community supervision. A copy of this law is on file at
the Archive of the University of Chicago Center for the Study of Constitutionalism in
Eastern Europe and with the U Chi L Sch Roundtable.
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The first pitfall lies with the document's exclusive origins in
deals between outside experts and Croatian elites. The existence
of a legal document of constitutional proportions that is crafted
by experts resembles a kite or balloon: it looks beautiful floating
above the earth, but has no influence on what goes on below. 9
This axiom is especially applicable with respect to minority pro-

tection laws which touch upon matters traditionally of local concern, such
as education, religion, agrarian reform, and lan40
guage.
While Arendt recalls that post-World War I expert documents inspired "mistrust,"4 this post-communist document
seems to inspire ridicule. The unanimous response that I received
to references to this law, passed by the Croatian Parliament, at
meetings with a number of human rights activists and Western
oriented lawyers in Zagreb during December 1992 was a chuckle
and an "0 yeah, that thing that was enacted for Lord
Carrington." The Conference on Security and Co-operation in
Europe's own rapporteur missions have reported similar reac-

tions.42 Little seems to have changed since the post-World War I
era, when Azcarate commented about international law's authority in the realm of minorities protection: "The public conscience is
insufficiently developed to be impressed by such criteria."43
2. The Backlash Factors.
Another set of undermining factors common to both the Mi-

" I borrow the metaphor from U.S. President John Adams. See Arendt, On Revolution at 145 n 9 (cited in note 29).
40 See Azcarate, League of Nations at 98 (cited in note 29) ("[ult will not, in fact, be
easy to find matters which are of a more specifically internal nature... than those comprising minority obligations"), 133 (subject matter of the Minorities Treaties was international in form, but "national in essentials").

"' Arendt recollects:

The constitutions of experts under which Europe came to live after the First World
War were all based, to a large extent, upon the model of the American Constitution,
and taken by themselves they should have worked well enough. Yet the mistrust
that they have always inspired in the people living under them is a matter of historical record as is the fact that fifteen years after the downfall of monarchical government on the European continent more than half of Europe lived under some form of
dictatorship.
Arendt, On Revolution at 145-46 (cited in note 29); see also Azcarate, League of Nations at
117 (cited in note 29) (commenting on popular "distrust" of League of Nations's Minorities
Committee), 119-20 (using example of foreigners' inability to have any restraining effect
upon Poland's punitive expeditions in 1930 in Ukraine).
42 CSCE I at 4, 8 (cited in note 25).
43 Azcarate, League of Nations at 131 (cited in note 29).

14

The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable

[1993:

norities Treaties and the Carrington Law stems from the attempt
to have international adjudicatory bodies guarantee the provisions. The Minorities Treaties empowered the League of Nations
Council to receive petitions, conduct fact-finding investigations,
and issue directives to those nations in violation of the Treaties.44 Similarly, Article 58 of the Carrington Law calls for the
creation of "an international body" to "supervise implementation."45 Moreover, Article 60 provides for the creation of a Court
of Human Rights for Croatia to enforce the Minorities Law. That
Court is to consist of a "President and two members ... nominated by the Presidency of the European Community from among
the ranks of citizens of its Member States; and the [other] two
members shall be nominated by the Parliament of the Republic of
Croatia from among its nationals."46 Thus, a majority of the
Court charged with protecting minorities in Croatia will consist
of foreigners selected by foreigners.
a) InternationalProtection of Minorities and the Role of
the State. International enforcement of minorities rights, as
provided for in the Minorities Treaties and the Carrington Law,
has two complementary costs in the context of Eastern Europe.
First, international enforcement undermines the likelihood of nations promoting themselves as compromisers and mediators
against particularized conflict. Second, it inspires regressive
traditionalism as a defense mechanism against international
interference's apparent threat to national integrity.
Having the foundation of minorities protection efforts in the
authority of outsiders implies that the state itself is not expected
to be responsible for integration, but only for taking care of and
representing the will of its own-in the most narrow sense.
Arendt, writing about international enforcement mechanisms in
Eastern Europe earlier in the century, recalls:
The real significance of the Minorities Treaties lies ... in
the fact that they were guaranteed by an international
body.... [Riecognition that millions of people lived outside
normal legal protection and needed an additional guarantee
of their elementary rights from an outside body and the
assumption that this state of affairs was not temporary, but

4 See id at 104-08 (cited in note 29) (describing the adjudicatory process).
4 The Carrington Law at Article 58 (cited in note 38).
4 Id at Article 60.
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that treaties were needed ... [constituted a policy by the
international community that] persons of different nationality needed some law of exception until or unless they were
completely assimilated and divorced from their origin. They
thereby admitted ... that the transformation of the state
from an instrument of law to an instrument of the nation
had been completed.47
Along the same line of thought, Azcarate observes that "statesmen of the countries subject by treaties to minorities obligations"
found international enforcement of the obligations "as likely to
prejudice the internal consolidation of the[ir] state[s]. " 4 Professor Branislaw Geremek, former Chair of the Polish Parliament's
Constitutional Committee, comes to an identical conclusion about
how the growing strength of the European Community will cause
decreasing possibilities for minorities to integrate and find protection within a nation.4 9
Azcarate adds that public directives from the League of Nations produced reactions within the "guilty" nation "against external interference in purely internal questions [that was] much
stronger than the [Minorities] Treaties themselves."0 The
League of Nations directives forced many progressive statesmen,
who otherwise could have used their domestic authority to solve
a minority's complaints, "to adopt a negative and uncompromising attitude."5 ' Moreover, state resistance based upon the invocation of national prestige usually succeeds due to such
reasoning's appeal to upper classes and other governments.52 Although the Carrington Law's Court of Human Rights has yet to
commence operation, a similar fate may await its rulings.
Underlying the backlash to the specter of internationalism
may be the cultural origins of East European nationalisms in
opposition to "bloodless, barren universalis[m]." 5 According to
Ernest Gellner's economic ratiofiality model of nationalism, East
European nationalisms arose because they engendered socioeconomic structures that were more productive in the industrial

47 Arendt, Totalitarianismat 273-74 (cited in note 21).

4 Azcarate, League of Nations at 130 (cited in note 29).
See Stephen Holmes, A ConversationAmong Students ofRevolution, Eastand West
(Book Review), E Eur Const Rev 37 (Fall 1992) (quoting and paraphrasing Geremek).
o Azcarate, League of Nations at 120-21 (cited in note 29).
51

Id at 121.

52

Id at 120.
Gelner English Manuscript at 9, 23 (cited in note 19).
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era than the static estate and caste systems of the empires.'
But then why do East European nationalist cultures resist the
universalism of the League of Nations and the European Community when these modern universalisms differ from Eastern
Europe's agro-literate era empires with respect to the potential
for advanced industrial era productivity? In contrast to the old
East European empires, the League sought and the Community
seeks to foster mobility, innovation, growth, universal education,
and meritocracy. Unfortunately, the cultures that emerged in
resistance to the universalism of agro-literate empires appear to
be largely unable to distinguish between modern universalism
geared toward industrial productivity and the unproductive universalism prevalent during the age of empires.
b) Reaction of the Croatian State. Turning to a more
recent example, the Croatian state's reaction to the imposition of
the Carrington Law has been in accordance with both the
Carrington Law's indirect implication that Croatia's role is to
represent primordial Croatian interests (while advocacy of
integration and minorities rights are for international mechanisms) and the defensive impulse to protect Croatian interests
(against the international community's interference on behalf of
the minorities). In particular, Croatia has been "consolidating"
itself through a highly exclusive citizenship process. Even
soldiers in the Croatian Army have been denied citizenship.
Officially, the citizenship law requires residence for ten years in
Croatia or a declaration of Croatian heritage.55 In practice, the
process relies heavily on tracing lineage to a book from the
1940s.5" A CSCE Rapporteur Report notes that Croatia's citizenship law is "creat[ing] many stateless people."5 7 This trend of
stateless minorities is precisely the type of consequence that
Arendt traced to the emergence of international authority with
respect to the guarantee of domestic rights after World War I.
At first glance, the recent attempt by the Croatian prosecutor
to ban the Croatian Party of Right as an extremist and racist
political organization appears to be an assumption of responsibili-

See id at 10-15; Ernest A. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell, 1983).
CSCE I at 8 (cited in note 25).
5' One of the harshest consequences of not obtaining citizenship is denial of the
continuity of pensions and other benefits to which Yugoslav citizens had vested rights.
"7 Thomas Fleiner-Gerster, Notes and Personal Impressions, Report of the CSCE
Human Rights Rapporteur Mission 1, 14 (May 1992).
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ty by the Croatian government for minority integration and protection. However, a closer look reveals the situation to be otherwise. The Party of Right 'platform takes the same stand as
President Tudjman's party toward Croatia's fascist legacy: approval of the Ustasha's so-called "positive ideas" and rejection of
the Ustasha's anti-human rights rhetoric and deeds." The only
significant difference is that the Party of Right had once backed
the HOS brigade, which was distinct from the Croatian Army.
However, at the request of the Party of Right, the HOS merged
into the Croatian Army in 1991. Consequently, most insiders
view the recent ban attempt as an effort by Tudjman's government to consolidate power by eliminating competition, rather
than a sincere effort to weed out extremists from influence in
Croatia. 9
c) Reaction of Minorities. As for the reaction of
minorities to international protection, Arendt and Azcarate
observe that the minorities are the first ones to perceive the
aforementioned implications of founding minorities protection in
international authority. Minorities responded to the Minorities
Treaties with the assertion that only those ethnic groups living
in their own nation have "true freedom, true emancipation and
true popular sovereignty," 0 while those dependent upon international authority lack the protection of "their own national
government" and are left in a fearful and dangerous position of
"abstract nakedness[,] of being nothing but human."8 ' The
Treaties represented a mistrusted and unfounded universality,
which, like the negative modernity of communism,6 2 fostered
primordialism rather than integration. Minorities "completely
disregarded the League of Nations[']" offer of protection as a
universalist threat and they formed their own Congress of
Organized National Groups in European States premised on
principles of primordialism and separatism-an endeavor that
did little to diffuse ethnic conflicts in the new nations. 3

' Zivko Gruden, Portraitof the President as a Blameless Man, E Eur Rptr 69 (JulAug 1992).
' See, for example, Zoran Batusic, The Rights of the Party of Right, E Eur Rptr 57,
58-59 (Nov-Dec 1992).
Arendt, Totalitarianismat 271 (cited in note 21).
"

Id at 271, 295.

See note 20 and accompanying text discussing how communism fostered and
suppressed evolution of primordial ethnic identities.
' Arendt, Totalitarianismat 272-73 (cited in note 21); see also Azcarate, League of
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Similarly today, most Serbs in Croatia have reacted to their
internationally guaranteed "minority privileges" as if they pose
threats rather than provide safeguards.' Few Serbs want to
participate in special Serbian language schools within Croatia, as
called for by the Carrington Law, because they fear that a record
of attendance will stigmatize them in Croatian society for life. 5
Local Serbian councils provided for by the Carrington Law want
their regions to secede and have taken no steps towards integration.66 As for the guarantees of proportional representation for
Serbs in the lower house of the Croatian Parliament, the Serbs
treat this privilege as a joke. In fact, the government had to
search desperately through the party lists to find enough Serbs
to fill those parliamentary seats designated for Serbs."
These reactions are partially the result of the on-again-offagain warfare in Serbian regions of Croatia. However, that fighting erupted originally in resistance to international recognition of
Croatia, despite common knowledge that the international community would mandate Croatia's consent to such minority protection accords.6" Indeed, the war in Croatia was more likely another symptom, rather than a cause, of the insecurity and regres-

Nations at 117, 131 (cited in note 29) (discussing the role of the Congress of Minorities
and minority "animosity" to reliance upon international protection, and concluding that
the most severe criticism of the Minorities Treaties came from the minorities).
Aleksa Djilas, Uncaptive Minds at 27 (cited in note 31).
As of January 1993, only one Serbian school has been opened pursuant to the
Carrington Law. The school only attracted seven students. Interview by the author with
Tia Pansic, Director of the Croatian Democracy Project, Zagreb (Dec 1992).
" Fleiner-Gerster, Report of the CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission at 14
(cited in note 57).
17 Under Article 18 of the Carrington Law, Serbs are currently guaranteed
8% of the
seats in the lower house of Parliament (Ethnic communities or minorities who comprise
more than 8% of the Croatian population are entitled to proportional representation in
the Croation Parliament. Ethnic communities or minorities who comprise less than 8% of
the Croation population are entitled to five representatives in the House of Representatives of the Croatian Parliament.) Nevertheless, no voters participate in elections in many
Serb dominated districts. In the August 1992 election, no Serbs won seats based on the
vote count. Three Serbs were taken from lists of parties that received over 3% of the vote,
which is the minimum that a party needs to have a representative in Parliament according to the Electoral Law. The rest of the Serbian parliamentarians were taken from the
Serbian People's Party (SPP), a group commonly referred to as "President Tudjman's
invented Serbs." Although, the SPP had received much less than 3% of the vote, the
Constitutional Court permitted candidates from the SPP's list to be admitted to Parliament to satisfy the Carrington Law's proportionality requirement.
' For example, in 1991 the EC Council of Ministers announced that it would only
recognize the independence of Yugoslavian Republics that accepted the Declaration on the
Criteria for the Recognition of the New States in Eastern Europe and USSR. Countdown:
A Chronology of Yugoslavia's Final Months, E Eur Rptr 4, 8 (Jan-Feb 1992).
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sive primordialism that arises from efforts to inspire reliance
upon the authority of international guarantees of domestic minority rights among those inevitably left behind in "county jails
for minorities" by efforts to destroy "prisonhouses of nations."
3. Administrative difficulties.
The final undermining factor common to the Minorities Treaties and the Carrington Law is the administrative impossibility
of implementation from the outside. While the enforcement efforts of the League of Nations Council were characterized by "extreme inadequacy,"69 the Carrington Law's Court of Human
Rights may never even function. How can five judges resolve all
of the minority conflicts in Croatia? It is little wonder that neither remedial mechanisms nor procedures have been promulgated. The enforcement of the Carrington Law is thus left to a rather depressing scenario: an international mechanism that exists
only on paper and a Croatian court system that local law professors concede is embarrassingly passive and lacks independence.70
III. CLOSING REMARKS ON THE CONVERSION OF EASTERN
EUROPE: BEYOND MINORITIES COUNCILS AND COURTS

Outsiders who aim to resolve such social crises as ethnic
conflicts risk becoming failed missionaries, because ethnic nation-

alists adhere to rigid and distinct metaphysical outlooks. The
League of Nations and its Council failed.7 '
" Arendt, Totalitarianismat 282-83 (cited in note 21); Azcarate, League ofNations at
97 (cited in note 29) ("the extreme inadequacy of the means placed at [the League of
Nations Council's] disposal by the Great Powers"), 118, 126 ("the Council did not possess
the necessary impetus to emerge successfully").
70 Professor Mihajlo Dika and other law professors and teachers in Zagreb frankly explained to me that the Croatian judiciary, including the Croatian Constitutional Court,
has no concept of reasoned opinions and the use of authorities. Apparently, the Croatian
courts are still victims of the "total legality-no legality" trend that existed during the
communist era. Pursuant to this trend, judges issue decisions without any reasoned
interpretation under the pretense that they are automatons. The result is the easy manipulation of results and the absence of the development of judicial or legal.thinking that
insulates the judiciary's independence. See Klingsberg, 1992 BYU L Rev at 123-24 nn
201-04 (cited in note 1) (discussing the implications of the Soviet vision of self-applying
law). There is also evidence of parliamentary and executive branch attempts to manipulate the judiciary. During Christmas 1992, the Croatian government reportedly had a
judge sent to the front line and transferred to a less powerful court after the judge had
ordered the release of a Serb prisoner.
71

All who consider the matter dispassionately must recognize that the guarantee of
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All indicators also point to the failure of the Carrington Law
and its Court of Human Rights. An adjudicatory organ, especially
one consisting of foreigners, is usually a poor proselytizer.7 2
The best reformers of a metaphysical universe often appear
to come from within that universe rather than from outside.
Azcarate recalls that the League of Nations succeeded when the
League's adjudicatory organ, the Council, played no role and
change seemed to result from "spontaneously adopted decisions"
of an 'accused' government" to fulfill a provision of the Minorities Treaties." Actually, these "spontaneous decisions" were
stimulated by neutral and secret mediation by the Minorities
Committee, a distinct entity that addressed matters prior to
judicial consideration by the Council. The role of the Committee
was neutral in the most fundamental sense: the Committee acted
not by applying the same rule fairly to all parties or by representing a "straight and clear-cut line ... of justice",74 but by
serving as an anonymous catalyst and vehicle for rational discourse that may have never taken place otherwise. Azcarate
rebuffs those "superficial" observers of minority conflicts who
prefer the "spirit and method of the judge,"75 and concludes that
his Committee's secret, neutral talks "represented the most advanced point which has been reached in what may be termed
international intervention in the internal life of states."76 If
"missionaries" are able to become part of "the internal life of
states" via subtle infiltration, they may be able to contribute to
the conversion process.

minority rights established by the League of Nations on the basis of the Minorities
Treaties did not give satisfaction to governments of the 'minority' countries, to the
minorities themselves, or-and this was the most serious factor of all-to that world
public opinion which was interested in minority questions.
Azcarate, League of Nations at 130 (cited in note 29).
72 Compare Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? (Chicago, 1991) with Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in
Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 Yale L J 1501 (1989) (debunking Michael

Perry's assertion that judges function as formulators of society's moral norms).
"' Azcarate, League of Nations at 120-21, 133 (cited in note 29). A possible contemporary analogy may be Bulgaria's successful implementation of human rights concessions to
the Turks via what appeared to be spontaneous actions of domestic state organs, but
actually were a result of "behind the scenes" pressures from the European Community.
Rumyana Kolarova, Oral Remarks at Roundtable Symposium on the Rights of Minorities
in East European Constitutions, University of Chicago Law School, Feb 20, 1993.
" Azcarte, League of Nations at 131 (cited in note 29).
75 Id at 128, 131, 134.

76 Id at 127.
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At the other end of the spectrum from the procedure utilized
by Azcarate's Committee is the full-fledged military enforcement
scenario utilized after World War II. History demonstrates that
the latter approach is also an effective means for converting
metaphysical outlooks in order to foster public solidarity," although such a strategy is costly and requires a lengthy commitment. The Carrington Law may only be able to succeed if accompanied by a generation-long, full-scale military enforcement effort
from the international community.
Subtle infiltration into "internal life" and the realistic threat
of violence are two effective means not only for resolving ethnic
conflicts from the outside, but also for forming the distinct metaphysical identities of ethnic groups. It is ironic that the means for
resolving these conflicts resemble the means for actually forming
oppressive nationalisms. This irony is a reason to be wary of farreaching solutions such as the promotion of a thoroughly homogeneous culture, a prescription that I have not discussed, but
which through vehicles like Music Television (a frightfully successful example of the infiltration strategy) may be doing more
than any other effort to overcome disharmonious traditions. My
hope is that some more mild conversion process will succeed in
resolving ethnic conflicts before we are left with sterile homogeneity.

' See Ernest Renan, What is a Nation? at 11 (cited in note 19) ("[Historical enquiry
brings to light deeds of violence which took place at the origin of all political formations,
even of those whose consequences have been altogether beneficial. Unity is always effected by means of brutality.").

